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Since Professor Gilmore wrote his famous book The Death oi 
Contraetl , it would seem that this branch of the law of obligations 
has been more discussed than ever in the English-speaking 
countries. Suffice it here to recall Atiyah's The Rise and Fall oi 
Freedom oi Contraet2 and Promises, Morals and Law3; Fried's 
Contraet as Promise4; Macneil's The New Social Contraet5 ; 
1. G. GILMORE, The Death o/ Contraet, Columbus, Ohio 1974. 
2. P. S. ATlYAH, The Rise and Fall o/Freedom o/Contraet, Oxford 1979. 
3. P. S. ATIYAH, Promises. Morals and Law, Oxford 1981. In eonneetion 
with the topie of this paper the following articles should also be mentioned: P. 
S. ATIYAH, "Contraets, Promises and the Law ofObligations",Law Quarterly 
Review,94 (1978), 193; P. S. ATIYAH, "Book Review", Harvard Law 
Review, 95 (1981), 509. 
4. C. FRIED, Contract as Promise: A Theory o/Contractual Obligation, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1981. 
5. I. MACNEIL, The New Social Contract: An Enquiry into Contractual 
Relations, New Haven 1980. See also I. MACNEIL, "The Many Fulures of 
Contraets", S. Cal. L. Rev., 47 (1974), 691; 1. MACNEIL, "Contraets: 
Adjustment of Long Term Eeonomie Relations Under Classical, Neoclassieal 
and Relational Contraet Law", Nw. UL. Rev., 72 (1978), 854; I. MACNEIL, 
"Eeonomie Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a 
Rich Classifieatory Apparalus", Nw. UL. Rev., 75 (1981), 1.018. 
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Posner and Kronman's The Eeonomies o[ Contraet Law6; and 
Eisemberg's artic1es on a "Responsive Model" of Contract Law7. 
Finnis8, Raz9 and Levin and Me Dowell10 have also published 
important contributions in this area. 
It seems c1ear, after reviewing this literature, that there is need 
to go back to first principIes and consider explicitly the basic 
purposes that the law of contract should serve before taking a 
position in controversial issues in contract theory such as 
expectation versus reliance and restitution damages, the extent to 
which the intentions of the parties should be respected by the law, 
the role of doctrines like privity, causa and consideration, and the 
advisability of merging contractual and delictual bases of 
obligation. 
Accordingly, the purpose of thisartic1e is to re-examine the 
question of the ultimate rationale and justification of the law of 
contracto The method used will be to analyze the philosophical 
foundations of two views of contract law which have been held in 
the English-speaking world, the "classical" theory and the more 
reeent "Death of Contraet" proposals. It is hoped that by 
uneovering the ultimate assumptions behind these eonceptions and 
6. R. POSNER & A. KRONMAN, The Economics 01 Contract, Boston 
1979; A. KRONMAN, "Contract Law and Distributive Justice", Yale L. J., 89 
(1980),472. 
7. M. A. EISEMBERG, "Donative Promises", U. Chi. L. Rev., 47 (1979), 
1; M. A. EISEMBERG, "The Bargain PrincipIe and its Limits", Harv. L. Rev., 
95 (1982), 741; M. A. EISEMBERG, "The PrincipIes of Consideration", 
Cornell L. Rev., 67 (1982),640; M. A. EISEMBERG, "The Responsive Model 
of Contract Law", en Stan. L. Rev., 36 (1984), 1.107. 
8. J. FlNNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford 1980, pp. 303-308, 
320-325. 
9. J. RAZ, "Promises and Obligations", Law. Morality and Society (p. 
Hacker and J. Raz, eds.), Oxford 1977; J. RAZ, "Voluntary Obligations and 
Normative Powers, 11", Proc. Arist. Soc., Supp. 59 (1972),99; J. RAl, "Book 
Review", Harv. L. Rev., 95 (1982),916. 
10. J. LEVIN, B. Me DOWELL, "The Balance Theory of Contracts: 
Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations", McGill L. J., 29 (1983), 24. 
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subjecting them to criticism it will be possible to see clearly the 
connections between ultimate philosophical premises and specific 
legal rules. While this analysis conceros two doctrines which have 
arisen within the common law tradition, it is hoped that it will be of 
interest to lawyers working within different traditions. There are 
two reasons for entertaining this hopeo In the first place, the 
Anglo-American doctrines to be examined have close parallels in 
civillaw systems. Secondly, these doctrines are studied only as a 
means of approaching the more general issue of what should be the 
fundamental purpose of the law of contract in a sophisticated 
modero society; it is clear that arguments put forward in this regard 
transcend the borders between specific legal traditions. 
The last part of the article will examine summarily the 
controversial issues in contract theory referred to aboye. The 
purpose of this is 10 illustrate how the basic rationale of the law of 
contract which is proposed here can cast light on the study of 
specific problems of more inmediate interest to lawyers. 
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 
In many ways the law of contract in the Anglosaxon world is a 
creature of the XIX Century. The common law had recognised 
what today we call contracts far earlier than this period, but in 
those earlier times it consisted primarily of rules about particular 
contracts. The distillation and elaboration of a body of general 
principIes applicable to all types of contracts was largely the work 
of the last century 11. It is not surprising, then, if we find that those 
11. In BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries, published in 1765, general issues of 
contract are dealt with very briefly in a few sections of vol. 11, ch. 30 and vol. 
III, ch. 9. In aH, only 28 pages are devoted lO them. There are, however, 
lengthy discussions of the rules applicable to individual contracts. By contrast, 
books suchas LANGDELL'S Casbook on Contract, published in the U.S.A. in 
1871, and POLLOCK'S Principies 01 Contract or ANSON'S Principies 01 the 
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principIes were greatIy influenced by the liberal and intensely 
individualistic ideology12 prevalent in the century of laissez-
¡aire 13. 
The c1assical theory of contract, as developed by English judges 
and writers during the XIX Century, was based squarely on the 
ideal of freedom of contract14. Its central feature was the autonomy 
Law of Contraet, both published in the U.K. in 1876 and 1879 respectively, 
focus almost entirely on general principies. 
12. The intellectual foundations of this individualistic philosophy had been 
elaborated in the XVIII Century, even though they had older roots, notably in 
Locke, Robbes and, further back, in Luther. 
13. One should be precise at this point. As P. S. Atiyah has shown in The 
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contraet, Oxford 1979, it is quite wrong to think 
of XIX Century England as a society where /aissez-faire reigned supreme. There 
were many other competing strands of thought and, at least after 1830, "the 
new middle classes set about the creation of a wholly new kind of society in 
which administrative powers and processes replaced, as modes of social and 
economic control, the discipline of free choice and freedom of contract" (p. 
231; see also pp. 238-250). But he also points out that "ideals based on 
/aissez-faire may well have had more influence on the judges and on judge-made 
law than they did on any other organ of the State" (p. 235). What happened is 
that the judges and textbook writers built a refined model of "contract" based on 
pure free-market principies, while all the modifications to those principies 
which the legislature introduced with increasing frequency were "simply defined 
as not being part of the law of contract, but of sorne other special and 
exeeptional body of rules-company law, or faetories legislation, or building 
regulations, or sanitary laws, or any one of a hundred other different branehes 
of social or economic activity" (p. 236). L. M. FRIEDMAN has described how 
a similar process took plaee in the U.S.A. during the same period in Contraet 
Law in Ameriea, Madison 1965. 
14. While the following paragraphs refer directIy only to the position in 
the U.K., similar ideas bccame prevalcnt in the U.S.A. with a slight time lag. 
In the end, bccause they were proleclcd constitutionally, they became even 
more powerful in that country. See A//geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 
(1897) (Fourteenth Amendment "liberty of contraet" prohibits State from 
regulating property owners contracting for marine insurance with foreign 
insurance company); Loehner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Fourteenth 
Amendment "liberty of contract" prohibits State from regulating the maximum 
hours per day or week a bakery cmployee may work); Adkins v. Children's 
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of the free choice of the parties to malee their own contracts on their 
own tenns. Primafacie, all contracts were entitled to the protection 
of the law and were to be held void only on the cIearest grounds of 
illegality, immorality or opposition to public policy (very restric-
tively construed). As Parke B. said in Egerton v. Bronwlow15: 
"Prima facie, aH persons ... are free to make such contracts as they 
please, and are moralIy and legalIy bound by them". 
Jessel M.R. made this point forcefully in Printing and 
Numerical Co. v. Sampson16: 
"If there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires, it is that men of fulI and competent understanding shall have 
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered 
into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by 
courts of justice". 
Classical theory saw all the effects of a contract as depending 
entirely on the intention of the parties; in no way as being imposed 
by the Courts or by the law. The Courts did not malee contracts for 
the parties, nor did they adjust the tenns agreed to by them; it was 
assumed that the parties were the best judges of their own 
interests. A consequence of this was that the courts assumed a 
purely passive and interpretative role; another was a refusal to read 
into the contract anything which the parties had not provided for, 
and insistence that tenns could be implied only when it was 
absolutely necessary to make the contract workable; another 
conseguence was that doctrines like duress or mistalee, which had 
been based in the XVIII century on simple ideas of fairness, carne 
to be explained as being cases of defective assent. It is also of 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (FifLh Amendment "liberty of contract" 
prohibits District of Columbia from prescribing minimum wages for women). 
15. (1853) 10 E.R. 359 at pp. 408-409. 
16. (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. at 465. 
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interest to note that when, in order to avoid situations of extreme 
injustice, the courts were forced to depart from the intentions of the 
parties, as in cases of frustration of the contract, they still 
attempted to justify their intervention as giving effect to "implied 
terms" of the contract. 
Finally, as Atiyah has observed, "The Courts were unwilling to 
examine what motivated a contracting party to act in any particular 
manner. If a buyer of goods, for example, had a right to reject the 
goods because the seller delivered them one day later, the buyer's 
rights would be scrupulously insisted upon without pausing to 
enquire into why aman exercised his rights in a particular manner, 
for that was the prerogative of the right-holder alone"17• 
What were the intellectual underpinnings of this ideal of 
freedom of contract? If there is an idea which stands out as 
fundamental to XIX Century social and political thought, it is that 
of the "Autonomy of the Will". Put simply, this doctrine says that 
each human being is born free and his dignity demands that he 
should obey only himself: his will is sovereign and it can accept 
only those obligations which it imposes on itself. The idea of a 
man being under a duty which he himself had not freely accepted 
either directIy or indirectIy18 seemed unintelligible to many at that 
17. P. S. ATIYAH, The Rise and Fall 01 Freedom 01 Contract, Oxford 
1979, p. 389. 
18. It was commonly accepted wiLhin lhat ideology Lhat man had sorne 
(rather minima!) duties imposed on him by lhe law of Lhe State; but Lhey were 
ultimately traced back 10 a postulated Social Contract, which had been assented 
to, at least tacitly, by aH men, by which each individual was supposed to have 
surrendered his individual autonomy in return for a like surrender by others 
which made sociallife possible. Even though Social Contract lheories as such 
were not defended explicitly in England in lhe XIX Century, Lhe essential point 
is that in the liberal view which prevailed in that century it was only Lhrough 
lhe continuing free choice of free individuals lhal societies and political 
communities existed. As R.H. TAWNEY has said "The conception of men as 
united to each olher, and of all mankind as united to God, by mutual 
obligations, arising [rom their rclation to a common end, ceased to be 
impressed upon men's minds" (The Adquisitive Society, London 1921, p. 14). 
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time: only "autonomous" actions were seen as really moral, as the 
authentic actions of a self-respecting mano 
It is not surprising, then, that within this c1imate of ideas the 
law of contract carne to hold pride of place within the law of 
obligations: self-imposed obligations were seen as the paradigm of 
all obligations, and the sanctity of contract was widely regarded as 
the keystone of the social and legal edifice. Promises had to be 
kept precisely because one had bound oneself to them by a 
sovereign will. Conversely, there was a strong tendency to restrict 
obligations which were not based on an element of free choice or 
consent. During that period tort law was almost completely 
restricted to the protection of property rights and a man's personal 
integrity. The modem law of negligence was almost completely 
undeveloped. That period also marked the nadir of the law of 
quasi -contracts. 
CRITIQUE OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 
In many ways the evolution of contract law during the XX 
Century has represented a constant movement away from the 
consequences of the ideology of the previous century. This 
evolution can be characterized by a frank recognition that the 
intention of the parties cannot be the basis of all contractual 
obligations and therefore that many of the so-called "implied 
terms" are nothing but rules of law to be incorporated to the 
contract in the absence of a contrary agreement and sometimes in 
spite of it; by the triumph of an objective theory of interpretation of 
the terms of the contract; and by a pervasive regulation of the terms 
of many contracts, especially of contracts of employment, money-
lending, tenancies and consumer contracts. It is obvious that the 
dogma of the autonomy of the will is no longer the basis of the 
common law rules of contract. And it is worth noting that this 
process of change has not been pIimaIily the result of the deliberate 
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application of a different ideology to the bw of contracto Rather, it 
has been a process guided by pragmatic considerations as the 
courts and the legislatures found in issue after issue that a strict 
application of the autonomy of the will conception and its 
associated contractual dogmas would inflict a real injustice on the 
weaker members of the society, which could in no way be justified 
by appealing to an often purely theoretical "respect for their dignity 
as autonomous moral agents". 
The abandonment of a concept of contract law based on the 
ideal of the autonomy of the will can only be applauded. The many 
ways in which that concept can be criticized may perhaps be 
summarized in the following arguments. 
In the first place, it is clear that the picture of the contracting 
parties as autonomous subjects freely laying down obligations on 
themselves is highly idealized. There are many contracts in whose 
formation the individual will of a person plays a very limited role. 
Only a tiny fraction of contracts represent anything like an explicit 
agreement of the parties. The overwhelming majority of contracts 
are embodied in printed forms, prepared by one party and offered 
to the other on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basisl9. In contracts to which 
this does not apply, the terms which the parties reaHy agree to 
-whether explicitly or implicitIy- are often only those essential to 
the contract as they envisage it; the parties usually do not address 
their minds at aH to what should be done in many possible 
contingencies20. Even commercial contracts between corporations 
19. Slawson asserts, probably correctly, that "Standard form contracts 
probalby account for more than ninety-nine precent of all the contracts now 
made. Most persons have difficulty remcmbering the last time they contracted 
other than by standard form; except for casual oral arrangements, they probably 
never have. But if they are active, they contract by standard form several times 
a day. Parking lot and theater tickets, package receipts, department store charge 
slips, and gas station crcrut card pruchase slips are all standard form contracts" 
(W. D. SLAUSON, /Jarv. L.R., 84 (1971), 529. 
20. As Lord Sands said in James SCOlt & Sons Ltd. v. Del Sel (1922) 
S.C. 592 at 597, "A tiger has cscapcd from a travelling menagerie. The milk 
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are very often made by using standard contracts common in a 
whole industry which incorporate aH manner of terms whose effect 
is only in the most general way "intended" by the parties. One 
must conclude that if a man's only real obligations are those he has 
imposed on himself by an act of will, most contracts fail to impose 
any obligation. 
Secondly, there are doctrines which are necessarily implied in 
the concept of the autonomy of the will, if the latter is going to 
make sense at aH. This is the case with doctrines like that of the 
Social Contract or sorne version of the doctrine of the General 
Will. Without having recourse to them it is impossible either to 
accept the theory of the autonomy of the will on to justify the many 
non-contractual duties which even the most libertarian State has to 
impose on its citizens. However, by now these doctrines have 
been exploded as thinly disguised myths21 • Without them the only 
polítical doctrine that a consistent defender of the autonomy of the 
will can defend is sorne form of libertarian anarchism22. 
Thirdly, if the source of obligation is nothing more than the act 
of will, the obligation should arise as soon as the act of will is 
completed. lt is clear, however, that there is an almost unanimous 
opinion, both in legal and moral contexts, that before a promise is 
binding it must, at least, be communicated to the promisee. 
Therefore, the act of will cannot be, by itself, the source of the 
obligation. 
girI fails to deliver the milk. PossibIy the milkman may be exonerated from 
any breach of contract, but, even so, it wouId seem hardIy reasonabIe to base 
that exoneration on the ground that 'tiger days excepted' must be heId as if 
written into the contract". 
21. See, e.g., J. PLAMENA'í.l, Consent, Freedom and Polilieal Obligation, 
Oxford 1968, 2nd ed., p. 8. HUME had already correclIy identified most of the 
essentiaI shortcomings of Social Contract theories in his Treatise of Human 
Nature (1740) and in Of Ihe Original Contraet (1748). 
22. R. NOZICK attempts something close lO this in Anarehy, State and 
Utopia,Oxford 1974. 
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Fourthly, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the will is ulúmately 
self-contradictory. The true reason why aman should keep a 
promise he made last year cannot be that he has imposed that 
obligation on himself by virtue of his sovereign will. If that were 
the case, his own will, which presumably is still sovereign, could 
today decide to remove that obligaúon. This argument is parallel to 
one quite well-known in constitutional theory: it is impossible for 
an absolute monarch to bind himself for the future for, being 
absolute, any law he makes today for himself, he can abrogate 
tomorrow23 • 
Finally, and most basically, proclamation of maximum auto-
nomy of the will as an ultimate and absolute ideal is based on 
recognizing one single intrinsic human good, thatof freedom or 
autonomy. Now to be able to act on one's own initiative, to have 
scope for shaping events and to determine how to conduct one's 
life, to be able to choose responsibly projects and commitments, 
not to be a puppet in somebody else's hands reduced to a machine-
like or animal-like status ... , all of this is certainly a great human 
good. In fact the history of Western man has been described by 
Christopher Dawson as a long quest for freedom; even more, it can 
be said that the recognition of the value of freedom is practically 
universal, and there is no people, however lacking in political 
capacity or experience, that is entirely insensiúve to its appeal. But 
while all of this is most certainly true, values such as life and 
health, knowledge of truth, appreciation of beauty, friendship and 
good fellowship in community, and reasonableness in directing 
one's life, are equally intrinsic goods which people can seek 
without ulterior purpose and enjoy for their own sake24. Other 
23. It is impossible for a monarch to bind himself for me future and 
remain an absolute monarch. But, of course, mere have been examples of 
monarchs granting oClroi constiLutions, i.e. constitutions which limit for me 
future their authority to makc laws. 
24. For a more complete epistemology of me basic human goods see,G. 
GRISEZ and R. SHA W, Beyond Ihe New Moralily: Ihe Responsabilities 01 
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basic intrinsic goods can be identified, and there are still others 
which are aspects or combinations of these basic goods, or means 
to attain them. In fact, any reasons we may have for saying that 
autonomy (or freedom) is something good, worth pursuing, also 
apply to the other values listed aboye. AH of them can be described 
as aspects of human flourishing and human well-being, and aH of 
them are worth having, irrespective of whether a given person has 
the time, talents or inclination to effectively pursue them. This 
topic cannot be further discussed here, but it is clear that if 
autonomy were the only real good, then all genuine agreements 
(Le., cases of duress, mistake, fraud, etc. excluded) should be 
kept; there would be no reason to cut down the free expression of 
individuals, at least for as long as this did not interfere with the 
freedom of others25 . On the other hand, as soon as it is recognized 
that human good is multifaceted and that the different dimensions 
of human well-being cannot be reduced without remainder to 
autonomy, the prohibition against ever interfering with a genuine 
act of will becomes far less tenable. Without going further, one can 
ask, for instance, why should an agreement between A and B 
which is unfair to B and greatIy to his disadvantage (and thus 
damaging of the goods of fellowship and reasonableness) be 
. enforced by public powers? Insofar as autonomy is only one 
aspect of human good, it is no longer obvious that the common 
good will be enhanced by protecting autonomy while disregarding 
other human goods. And it is interesting in this connection to 
notice that the very people who defended the doctrine of the 
autonomy of the will (anarchists always excluded) implicitIy 
admitted that autonomy could not be the only good, for if it were, 
Freedom, Notre Dame and London 1974, ch. 7; J. M. FINNIS, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, Oxford 1980, chs. 3,4 and 5. 
25 . But the point made aboye should be kept in mind. If autonomy were 
the only good, that would be a reason to hold, not that all agreements must be 
kept, but rather that no agreement needs be kept. This point is waived in the 
text for the sake of the present argument. 
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any version of the social contract theory in which men had 
originally surrendered part of their autonomy would become 
nonsensical. What good could men possibly obtain in exchange for 
their surrendered autonomy if autonomy were the only good? 
THEORY OF THE NON-BINDING NATURE OF PROMISES 
Professor Atiyah's ideas on the nature of promises and 
contracts have attracted wide attention during the last years. They 
will be discussed here not because of their direct influence 
-Atiyah's work is too recent to have had much impact on the law 
yet-, but because they can be seen as a well articulated exposition 
of views which can justify important recent proposals, especially 
those associated with the "death of contract". By criticizing now 
the contentions of the Oxford professor, we will be laying down 
the groundwork for sorne of the positions we will defend latero 
The key feature of Atiyah's account is that he does not view 
promises as important sources of obligations26. He thinks that 
many obligations which are usually regarded as being promise-
based .are not really such. 
Thus, for instance, let us consider an agreement wherebey A 
lends B noo to be repaid three months latero Most lawyers would 
see this transaction as an example of a contract where A's 
obligation to pay B noo in three monts' time is based on his 
agreement (promise) to do so. But Atiyah is emphatic that the true 
justification of A's obligation is ·the fact that he has received noo 
and, the transaction not being a gift, he will of course have to pay 
them back. In other words, the obligation is based not on the 
promise, but on the justice of making restitution of the benefit 
received. 
26. It is of interest to point out, however, that he moderates his earlier 
statements on this issue in his Essays on Contract, London 1986, pp. 44-45. 
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Similarly, if A promises to deliver 100 machine parts to B for B 
to use in his factory, and, relying on this promise, B fails to make 
alternative arrangements to obtain the parts he needs, Atiyah 
asserts that the true basis of A's obligation to supply the parts or 
pay compensation for his failure to do so, is not A's promise but 
the fact of B's reasonable reliance on A's assurance and the 
potential or actual harm to B's interests. 
Does Atiyah think, then, that promises have no significance? 
Not quite. In his own words "where obligations arise out of the 
rendering of benefits or from acts of reasonable reliance, the 
presence of an explicit promise may ... serve valuable evidentiary 
purposes"27. Thus, in the case of a loan of money, "[the promise] 
helps to avoid doubts about the nature of the transaction. The 
possibility of a gift is ruled out by the express promise to repay ... 
Then again an explicit promise may help settle many minor or 
ancillary terms, and it is worth reflecting on how and why this is 
the case. Suppose, for example, that the borrower promises to 
repay the loan with interest at a specified rate ... [this] functions 
very like a conclusive admission. If the court is to search for a fair 
and reasonable rate of interest, the rate which the borrower has 
agreed to pay is good evidence that that is in fact the fair and 
reasonable rate. Good evidence, but not conclusive evidence. For 
if the agreed rate of interest is extortionate, or if it has be en 
obtained by fraud or misrepresentation the promise to pay will not 
bind"28. 
Likewise, in reliance cases the main function of the promise will 
be to serve as evidence that the promisee was really justified in 
relying on the promisor. 
But even if all of this were admitted for the purpose of 
argument, we would surely still be left with purely executory 
promises in cases where the promisee has not relied on the promise 
27. P. S. ATIYAH, "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations", 
Law Quarterly Review, 94 (1978), pp. 193-207. 
28. [bid., pp. 207-208. 
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in any way nor conferred any benefit on the promisor. In modem 
legal systems a party is held liable on such a promise and most 
people would certainly think that the promisor was also morally 
liable. Thus, if A engages to buy a car from a car dealer at a certain 
price, delivery and payment to be effected two weeks later, A is 
held to be under a legal (and moral) obligation to keep to the 
agreement even prior to any action of B in reliance on the 
agreement. What is Atiyah's view of these situations? 
First,he says that these situations are comparatively very rare, 
for reliance normally follows hard on the heels of the making of 
mutual executory promises. Moreover, he asserts that in any case 
the strength of the obligation created is very weak; in order to 
substantiate this last point he calls attention to the mitigation of 
damages rule whereby the innocent party to a breach of contract 
cannot recover damages for a los s which he has, or could have, 
avoided by taking reasonable steps following the breach; accor-
dingly if the promisee can obtain substitute performance elsewhere 
at no additional cost he is expected to do so; thus where a seller 
fails to deliver goods but equivalent goods are available in the 
market at or below thecontract price, or where an employee 
resigns without giving adequate notice but an adequate replacement 
can be hired without delay, the sanction for the breach of contract 
will in fact, be, nil. This, in Atiyah's view, reflects the low 
binding quality that society puts on such unpaid for and unrelied 
upon promises. 
This view of the moral foundations of promises has important 
consequences for contract theory. The main one is that the 
distinctiveness of the law of contract within the law of obligations 
is blurred. Those promises which, in Atiyah's view, are binding 
because of the reciprocal benefit which the promisee had conferred 
on the promisor could easily be assimilated to cases traditionally 
c1assified as "quasi-contract" or "restitution"; in fact, all the more 
important issues dealt with under these rubrics concem precisely 
the obligations which may in certain cases result from the conferral 
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of unsolicited benefits. And those other promises which in 
Atiyah's view become binding by virtue of the promisor relying on 
them can be seen to have a close family resemblance to tort cases, 
for it is characteristic of tortious or delictua1liability that it arises as 
consequence of harm done to others. Thus, referring to the modem 
attitude of making a vendor of defective goods strict1y liable to 
anyone who uses the goods and not only to those who buy them, 
Atiyah says: "if we ask, further, why the obligation should be 
imposed, we will find, in most cases, that the twin elements of 
benefit and detriment underlie the judgement. In this particular 
case, for instance, it would be widely agreed that the vendor gets 
the benefit of the sale, that the purchaser or user relies upon him 
to distribute goods which are not dangerous, and that these 
two factors, together with the fact that the sale is a voluntary 
transaction, suffice to justify. the obligation "29. As a logical 
consequence of this approach he advocates avoiding any sharp 
divisions of the law of obligations into contract, quasi-contract and 
tort. He thinks that "a more adequate and more unifying conceptual 
structure for the law of obligations can be built around the 
interrelationship between the concepts of reciprocal benefits, acts 
of reasonable reliance, and voluntary human conduct"30. 
CRITIQUE OF A TIYAH'S THEORY 
This theory about the foundations of contract law is open to 
serious criticismo First and most clearly, while it is true that in 
many cases liability is based both on a promisory and on a 
reliance-or-benefit basis, this in no way proves that the promise 
has no effect in creating the obligation. If aman is standing on two 
legs and it can be shown that one of the two could by itself bear his 
29. P. S. ATIYAH. op. cit .• in n. 2 at p. 222. 
30. ¡bid .• p. 223. 
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entire weight, it does not follow that the other leg actualIy perfonns 
no function. Atiyah's only argument for holding thát promises by 
themselves create only very weak obligations is to say that that 
seems to be the prevalent view in modern society. Of course, this 
rests on a most inadequate view of morality as the creation of the 
social group. But even accepting his assumptions Atiyah's case 
cannot stand. He grants that "it is, of course, the case that current 
moral codes do treat promises as morally binding, and that the law 
general1y treats them as legally binding"31. Besides, the only 
positive proof he offers of the low binding quality which society 
attaches to pure promises is the existence and effects of the rule 
of mitigation of damages referred to aboye. But this rule can 
be justified as an attempt to prevent harsh and unscrupulous 
promisees from reaping unmerited windfalls at the cost of 
promisors who, often through no fault of their own, have become 
unable to keep their undertakings32. It is always the case that the 
law has to try to reconcile many conflicting aims and policies in 
situations of great complexity, but nobody thinks of arguing, for 
instance, that strict rules of evidence which result on many 
murderers going free show that the law places a low value on the 
protection of human life. And in situations where the mitigation 
rule is not applicable the courts are quite ready to uphold purely 
executory promises in all their strictness. In White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor33 the House of Lords held that 
advertising contractors who had agreed to display advertisements 
for the respondent for three years were entitled to refuse to accept 
31. P. S. ATIYAH, op. cit., in n. 3, p. 203. 
32. An iIlustration may be helpful here. A orders several pieces of furniture 
from B, a carpenter. The day after placing the order A is posted by his company 
to a different town and therefore has no further use for the furniture. According 
to the rules of damages, A is ljable lO pay B a11 the profit B would have 
obtained from the contract even though nothing had been done under it and B 
had becn put to no expense or inconvenience. But in most cases like this the 
rule of mitigation of damages will prevent such a harsh resulto 
33. [1962] A.C. 413. 
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his repudiation of the agreement. Although the repudiation took 
place on the same day that the contract was made the appellants 
were held entitled to sue for the price and were not limited to an 
action for damages. From such cases it must be conc1uded that the 
law's recognition of the binding force of promises per se is greater 
than Atiyah would have us think34. 
Again, to say that the promise has a purely evidential value 
involves consequences that contradict the spontaneous moral 
convictions of most people as well as the practices of the courts. It 
is true that the fact that all persons whose interests are affected by a 
certain arrangement have freely consented to it has a prima facie 
evidential value in showing the fairness of that arrangement. But if 
the promise were truly only one piece of evidence, it would have to 
be contrasted with other pieces of evidence, which perhaps would 
point in different directions; and there would be no guarantee that 
in a case of conflict of evidence between the promise and the other 
pieces of evidence, the promise would carry the day. This can be 
seen c1early by elaborating on the example of a loan transaction 
offered aboye. If the only source of the obligation to pay interest 
were the fact itself of the loan the agreement of the borrower to pay 
a certain rate of interest would tend to show that the rate was fair 
and reasonable as between the parties. But if the true function of 
the court were to ascertain what was a fair and reasonable rate in 
the circumstances of the case, the court would have to consider 
many other factors, several of which would in all likelihood be 
given more importance than the fact that the parties themselves had 
agreed to a given rate and thus presumably thought it fair. Factors 
such as the state of the money markets at the time, the risk of the 
transaction, the credit worthiness of the borrower and the collateral 
he had been able to offer, etc ... would have to be explicitIy 
discussed in every case. It is quite obvious that this does not 
34. A similar decision was reached by the Court of Appeal in 
Centrovineial Estates pie v. Merehant Investors Assuranee Co. Ltd. (1983) 
Com L. R. 158. 
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happen and that outside cases where the rate agreed upon violates 
some statute, or is unconscionable in the circumstances of the case 
or where a vitiating condition as fraud or duress exists, the court 
applies as a matter of course the rate agreed upon. Is it not clear 
that the court is giving effect to an agreement of the parties rather 
than seeking to ascertain an objective standard and using the 
agreement for evidential purposes only? And is it not clear that 
almost everybody would agree that this is the proper function of 
the courts in these cases35? In this issue it is Atiyah contra 
mundum. 
Finally and perhaps most importantIy, the main objection which 
can be addressed to Atiyah's conception is that he seems to 
completely fail to appreciate the value of personal autonomy. He 
thinks that there has been "a decline in the belief that the individual 
has the right to determine what obligations he is going to assume, 
and an increased strength in the belief that the social group has the 
right to impose its own solution on its members, dissent as they 
may"36, he also states that "the social group today is still willing to 
delegate considerable autonomy to its members; and it does this (in 
this sphere) largely by enabling them to admit, more or less 
conclusively, that circumstances exist in which the group 
recognizes the existence of obligations. But the modern social 
group has much more difficulty in recognizing the right of 
individual s to create obligations in circumstances where the group 
itself do es not recognize the existence of obligations"37. We have 
already challenged at one point the accuracy of his description of 
the prevalent convictions on this issue, and the last years have 
shown even more clearly that people can respond quite positively 
35. In itself this argument only shows that Atiyah's thesis does not agree 
with the moral opinions of most people. But, given his assumption that 
morality is the creation of the social group, it is far more damaging against 
him. 
36. P. S. ATIYAH, op. cit., in n. 3, p. 130. 
37. [bid., p. 194. 
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to political proposals which tilt back towards personalliberty the 
balance between individual freedom and group regulation. Be that 
as it may, the radical problem is caused by Atiyah's view of 
morality as "the creation of the social group ... it must be the group 
which ultimately decides what conditions justify the creation of 
moral obligations"38. This radically conventional view of morality 
leaves the theorist without any standpoint from which to criticize 
the commonly accepted morality; accordingly, Atiyah goes on to 
postulate without further qualification that autonomy should be 
deemphasized by the law in favour of community views. But there 
is no good reason why the theorist should be so subservient to 
commonly accepted values; even if it were the case that the 
conventional morality of a given society has Httle or no 
appreciation for the good of individual autonomy, it surely is not 
meaningless for the theorist to discuss how far that assessment is 
correct, especially if the theorist is trying to provide a rationale for 
promissory and contractual obligation. Because he accepts a radical 
devaluation of the value of individual autonomy without furnishing 
any reasons why such a devalutation should be considered 
desirable, Atiyah's proposals are radical1y defective. 
While this last point will be further elaborated in latter part of 
this article39, it will be helpful if sorne illustrations of the 
implications of Atiyah's theses are given here. In sorne countries, 
for instance, the details of the conditions of employment in 
particular industries were fixed by law in such detail that almost no 
scope was left for the determination of the conditions of service by 
the parties. Even if it is granted that this was or is the only way 
to protect the generality of workers from exploitation by 
unscrupulous employers, it should be apparent that this protection 
is bought at sorne cost to many other employees and employers 
who, for many legitimate reasons, could have preferred different 
38. ¡bid., p. 193-194. 
39. Sce below. "The Merger of Contract and Tort". 
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arrangements. As a matter of fact, once economic development has 
rendered less pressing the need for protecting weaker workers, the 
tendency almost everywhere has been to relax the regulation by 
law of conditions of employment40. But nothing in Atiyah's 
principIes allows one to take into account the essential value 
involved here. 
Atiyah himself refers to the issue of product liability. He would 
like to bypass the traditional contractual basis of this type of 
liability in order to justify the imposition on vendors of strict 
liability to buyers and users on the basis of the facts that "the 
vendor gets the benefit of the sale, that the purchaser or user relies 
upon him to distribute goods which are not dangerous, and that 
these two factors, together with the fact that the sale is a voluntary 
transaction, suffice to justify the obligation"41. Now it may be the 
case that in consumer sales there are good reasons to impose on the 
vendor this strict liability, irrespective of his wishes and of the 
wishes of the buyer. If such is the case, it will constitute an 
example of how sorne people who are perfectIy able to take care of 
themselves may have to surrender the freedom to structure their 
relationships in the way they think proper in order to ensure a more 
perfect protection of those others -perhaps a majority- who might 
otherwise be imposed upon. But to deny this freedom also to 
businessmen contracting with each other at arms length is far less 
justifiable. If a party is ready to accept a greater risk -including 
perhaps risks towards third parties- in returo for a lesser price 
40. Atiyah observes on severa! occasions that contemporary ethics is more 
paterna lis tic than it was the case in the XIX Century. It may be opportune here 
to comment that paternalism looks on men as incapable children rather than as 
responsible adults. In so far as it may be true that present day arrangements 
tend to be paternalistic, they should be criticized rathcr than blandly accepted. 
Paternalism may be justified towards people who, for one reason or another, 
are unable lO take care of themselves, but even in this case it should assume 
the role of a temporary educator rather than that of a permanent dictator. 
41. P. S. A TIYAH, Contrcts, "Promises and the Law of Obligations", Law 
Quarterly Review, 94 (1978), 193. 
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(perhaps because he can insure more cheaply or because he can 
protect himself more effectively against the relevant risk~) to deny 
him the possibility of doing so would unnecessarily cramp his 
autonomy. And in a law of obligations based on the concepts of 
"reciprocal benefits, reasonable reliance and voluntary conduct"42, 
this could easi1y be the common fate of the parties to aH 
relationships. The law would determine the duties of parties to 
each type of relationship and the only freedom left to individual s 
would be to decide to enter into a given relationship or refrain from 
doing so, for this is what "voluntary human conduct" seems to 
amount to in Atiyah's framework. 
lt seems that Atiyah has overreacted against the dogma of the 
sovereignty of the will by going to the opposite extreme and has 
failed to see, or at least has radically devalued, the good involved 
in the law giving men the opportunity to modulate many of their 
own obligations and commitments. But once it is explicitIy 
recognized that freedom is a real good and a most valuable 
component of the common good, the reasonable objective for the 
law is to protect and guarantee each man's right to exercise his 
capacity for initiative while trying to prevent his exercising it to the 
detriment of the common good. A proper implementation of these 
elementary principIes will call for technical instruments to defend 
the common good from the possible attacks of individual 
freedom43, not for a complete denial of that freedom. 
A BASIC RATIONALE FOR THE LA W OF CONTRACT 
This paper does not aim at establishing the foundation in 
morality of promissory obligation, but at examining the basic 
rationale of the law of contracto The basic issue from this 
42. Idem. 
43. See bclow, "Frccdom of Contract and J ustice in Exchanges". 
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perspective is to show the ways, if any, in which the regulation 
and enforcement of contracts by those in authority fosters the 
common good, that is, the good of the society as a whole. 
Basically, contracts allow people to as sume voluntarily sorne 
legal obligations and to shape at least sorne of them according to 
their own desires; they give people the chance to exercise a 
measure of control over their relationships. commitments and 
duties, fostering in this way, as we have seen, the important 
human goods of freedom and initiative. 
But contracts should not be seen only, or even primarily, as 
instruments of individual expression. They also provide a way of 
establishing co-operation overtime among several persons. This 
co-operation needs not be directed to the achievement of purely 
selfish objectives. Its object might be the promotion of sorne 
political ideas, or carrying out sorne charitable work, or doing 
business in partnership, or raising a family and providing mutual 
support in marriage. But whatever may be the objective, if two 
parties are going to engage in a lasting co-operation, each of them 
must be able to rely on the other behaving in a certain way, not 
only now but also in the future. And the law can increase the 
reliance of one party on the future conduct of another basically 
through two different mechanisms: it can either provide that the 
second party will behave in a certain way irrespective of his 
wishes, or it can give him the scope to voluntarily commit himself 
to act in a certain way. This second way is the technique of 
contract44• 
Human beings need to co-operate with others in thousands of 
ways if they are to survive and develop their potentialities. So co-
operation there must be -if necessary enforced co-operation-, all 
theories of sovereignty of the will notwithstanding. What the 
44. The great social importance Lhat the technique of contract has is well 
brought out in E. DURKHEIM, The Division 01 Labor in Society (G. 
Simpson, trans., 1933) and 1. MACNEIL, The New Social Contract: An 
Enquiry into Contractual Re/ations, New Haven 1980. 
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institution of contract adds to this basic certainty is the possibility 
of establishing even large-scale co-operation (one can think of a 
large limited liability company with tens of thousands of 
shareholders and employees) while still preserving the good of 
individual freedom. 
Agreements are possible without the protection of the law, and 
even if there were no law of contract there would still be a social 
practice of making promises and moral and social norms would 
protect it, as they now do, imposing on people the duties of paying 
their debts, keeping their promises and generally being truthful and 
acting in good faith in their dealings with each other. But on the 
basis only of this practice and of the voluntary observance of the 
moral duties attached to it, many agreements would be far less 
reliable than they are now. It is clearly the case that agreements 
between complete strangers, agreements involving large numbers 
of people, and agreements intended to operate for a long period of 
time would be far less reliable and, therefore, far less common, if 
they did not have the support of the law. And, of course, the law 
will also be quite useful in giving precision, c1arity and certainty to 
many of the obligations involved in the performance of 
agreements, in providing a machinery for the settlement of disputes 
among the parties, etc. 
The aboye considerations can be summarized by saying that the 
justification for the law to protect and reinforce the social practice 
of promising is simply that this practice is very much for 
the common good, enhancing as it does not only the good 
of individual autonomy but also those of co-operation and 
trustworthiness; and, in so far as it is an empirical truth that private 
initiative is, at least in sorne situations, more effective than public 
enterprises, it also promotes efficiency in the attainment of 
objectives. 
At the same time we have already insisted aboye on how there is 
no question of seeing individual autonomy as the only intrinsic 
human good, or even as an overriding one. There is therefore no 
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reaso.n o.f principIe to. allo.w co.ntracts to. beco.me a vehicle fo.r the 
perpetratio.n o.f injustice o.r fo.r the do.minatio.n o.f so.me human 
beings by o.thers. In so. far as the basis fo.r protecting the practice is 
the pro.mo.tio.n o.f the co.mmo.n go.od there is no. a priori reaso.n why 
o.ne aspect o.f that co.mmo.n go.o.d (tho.se just mentio.ned in the last 
paragraph) sho.uld be allo.wed to. co.mpletely o.vershado.w o.ther 
equally impo.rtant aspects o.f the same co.mmo.n go.o.d (the 
pro.mo.tio.n o.f just relatio.nships and faír dealing, the pro.tectio.n o.f 
the weak members o.f the so.ciety, the fo.stering o.f co.mmo.n bonds, 
etc.). 
Perhaps a brief co.nsideratio.n o.f the main differences between 
Atiyah's po.sitio.n and that defended here may help to. understand 
better bo.th o.f them. Atiyah seems strangely to. narro.w his focus 
and pay attentio.n o.nly to. the parties to. the co.ntract. Thus if a party 
has neither relied o.n the co.ntract no.r paíd fo.r it, the o.nly harm he 
will suffer in case o.f breach is the disappo.intment o.f his 
expectatio.ns; Atiyah co.ncludes that if this is the case there is 
co.mparatively little reaso.n to. keep the co.ntract and this will have 
but little binding fo.rce. It can be seen that the ratio.nale o.ffered here 
differs in two. key respects from Atiyah's. First, it emphasizes the 
effect o.f breaching the co.ntract o.n the co.mmo.n good, no.t o.nly o.n 
the o.ther party. While this is also. the key to. a pro.per understanding 
o.f pro.mises in mo.rality, it sho.uld be especially o.bvio.us that the 
co.mmo.n go.o.d is the proper vantage po.int from which to. co.nsider 
the way in which the law sho.uld treat promises. And from the 
po.int o.f view o.f the co.mmo.n go.od what is primary is the need to. 
protect the institution oi promising and to. enco.urage peo.ple to. rely 
o.n it and use it in ever mo.re creative ways so. as to. pro.gressively 
make po.ssible mo.re ambitio.us fo.rms o.f vo.luntary co.-o.peratio.n. 
Seco.ndly, while Atiyah co.ncentrates o.n the harm mat the breach o.f 
a pro.mise will cause, the acco.unt o.ffered here is no.t so. restricted. 
There is no. go.o.d reaso.n to. co.nfine the purpo.se o.f the law to. 
the avo.idance o.f harm. The law do.es o.ften co.ncern itself, and 
rightly so., with fo.stering the co.mmo.n go.o.d in a po.sitive way. 
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Therefore the consideration that if promises -even purely 
executory promises- are protected, richer modes of voluntary co-
operation will become accesible to the cornmunity provides a good 
reason for the state to protect them through the medium of the law. 
The aboye considerations should be read with precision. The 
contention is that the law should protect the practice of promising, 
not that the whole of what at present is classified as the "law of 
contract" should do this and nothing else; far less that it actually 
does so. Therefore if sorne or many of the rules of law currently 
classified as "contract" can be shown to have the function of 
protecting reliance, or avoiding unjust enrichment, or allocating the 
risks and losses of social interaction on the basis of non-promisory 
principIes of justice, or protecting unsophisticated or unskilful 
bargainers, this in no way affects the thesis of this papero 
Even if this is granted, however, nobody should be in a hurry 
to argue that the law of contract, as structured nowadays, is a mere 
disparate collection of unrelated odds and ends without intemal 
unity. As Raz has pointed out "the nonpromissory liability 
recognized by contract law is based on the principIe of estoppel 
and ... its purpose is not merely to protect individual s from harm, 
but also to protect the practice of promising itself. For if people 
were often to' let it appear that they have promised when they have 
not, the currency of promises would be debased and their appeal 
and utility greatly diminished ... Paradoxical though it sounds, it 
is in order to protect the practice [of undertaking voluntary 
obligations] from abuse and debasement that the law recognizes the 
validity of contracts that are not voluntary obligations"45. Related 
observations could be made in respect of the other possible 
objectives of the law mentioned in the last paragraph. 
45. J. RAZ, "Promises in Morality and Law", Harv. L. R., 95 (1982), pp. 
934-935. 
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CONTROVERlED ISSUES IN CONTRACT THEORY 
AH of the aboye discussion might appear to be highly abstract 
and somehow remote from more mundane realities. In order to 
better appreciate the import of the conclusions reached there it may 
be useful to see the light they can cast on sorne controverted issues 
of contract theory. 
1t may be useful to make it clear, before proceeding any further, 
that there is no question of engaging here in that procedure, so dear 
to the representatiyes of the rationalist school of Natural Law, of 
trying to deduce a complete legal system from a few basic 
precepts. What specific rules are appropiate to a given time and 
place depends in many important ways on contingent factors which 
cannot be incorporated in any purely abstract model. And beyond 
this, as Finnis has often forcefully pointed out46, following the 
teachings of Aquinas on this point47, a specific legal rule can be 
rationally connected with a partially indeterrninate general principIe 
without necessariIy haying apure 10gicaI connection with it. As 
Finnis has said "there can be a particularization of general ideas, 
commitments and principIes by ... Iegislators and jurists, by steps 
none of which is itseIf necessary, and all of which could have been 
in sorne respect different -so that there is, in these myriads of 
instances, no uniquely correct solution- but all of which are 
reasonable and non e of which could without risk of error have 
been taken randornly or without regard to coherence with the larger 
whole constituted by the initial general idea or ideas of vaIue, 
cornrnitment of principIes and by the steps aIready taken"48. 
46. See J. M. FINNIS, op. cit., in n. 8, pp. 284-286, 294-295; also "On 
'the Critical Legal Studies MovemcnL''', American Journal 01 Jurisprudence, 30 
(1985),21, pp. 31, 37, 38, 40. 
47. Thomas AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, 1-11, 95, 2. 
48. J. M. FINNIS, op. cit., in n. 8, p. 38. 
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But if this point is clear, it will be of interest to examine the light 
that the general principIes discussed in the first part of this paper 
can cast on more practical issues. 
Expectation Damages Versus Reliance or Benefit Damages 
There have been frequent arguments in the literature on what 
should be the appropriate measure of damages to award to the 
innocent party in case of breach of contract. The leading case in 
common law jurisdictions is Hadley v. Baxendale49 in which it 
was decided that the innocent party was entitled to "expectation 
damages", that is to say, to be put in the same position as he would 
have been had the contract been carried out. The measure is lucrum 
cessans as opposed to only damnum emergens. Therefore, as a 
general rule, the innocent party is entitled to any profits he would 
have made had the contract been performed, that is, to the value of 
his "expectation", and this even if he has conferred no benefit on 
the other party before the breach and no detrimental reliance has 
taken place. Many academic lawyers have criticised the law in this 
respect and have contended that, at least in many cases, "reliance 
damages" -Le. compensation for the actuallosses suffered because 
of reliance on the contract- or "benefit damages" -Le. compen-
sation for the benefits conferred on the party in breach so that this 
will not benefit from any unjust enrichment- would be more 
adequate. 
As a general rule the thesis that it is a proper function of the law 
to protect and strengthen the practice of promising will tend to 
favour the award of expectation damages in case of breach, for this 
measure of damages makes it as expensive to breach as to carry out 
49. (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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the exchange (e.g. in situations where the market price of goods a 
party had promised to deliver at a certain price has gone up in the 
mean time) and therefore wiU tend to promote the fulfilment of 
promises50. The expectation damages rule also allows the parties 
to plan on the basis that the contract will be performed, knowing 
that in any case they will at least receive the equivalent economic 
value of that performance; failure to enforce contracts to their full 
extent would reduce the willingness of people to enter into and 
plan on the basis of contracts. Final1y, even if in sorne cases 
reliance damages could have been a more fair remedy there is the 
important practical consideration that in most cases expectation 
damages are approximately equal to the cost of reliance but much 
easier to measure; to leave it to the courts to determine in every 
case whether reliance on the contract caused harm would lead to 
expensive litigation and frequent judicial mistakes thereby reducing 
the reliability of contracts51 . 
The aboye is only a general rule and exceptions can certainly be 
appropriate in certain classes of case. Foremost among them are 
cases where there has been no real agreement between the parties 
but the law, in order to promote the reliability of contracts, decides 
to hold the party at fault --e.g. by making a unilateral mistake, or 
by using words which could reasonably be understood as 
constituting an offer though he did not intend them so- liable as if 
50. See, foc instance, BARTON, "The Economic Basis of Damages foe 
Beeach of Contract", J. Legal Studies, 1 (1972), 277. 
51. This was basically Fullec's justification of expectation damages 
(FULLER & PERDUE, "The Reliance Inteeest in Contract Damages (pt. 1)", 
Yafe L.J., 46 (1936), 52 at pp. 61-62). See also E. AUan FARNSWORTH, 'The 
Past of Promise", Co. L. Rev., 69 (1969), 576 at pp .. 596-597. On this issue 
Atiyah suggests that the contract-beeaker sould have the onus of showing that 
the promisee did not rely upon the contract (Essays on Contract, London 1986, 
p. 171). It is not cIear that this solves the problems. EIsewheee in the same 
book (p. 114), in the context of a different argument, the same author 
illustrates the benefits of not having to prove, or disprove, reHance. Foe a 
fuller consideration of many of these issues see M. A. EISEMBERG, "The 
Bargain PrincipIe and its Limits", lIarv. L. Rev., 95 (1982), p. 741. 
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he had really agreed. In these cases the real basis of liability is 
delictual rather than contractual and accordingly a powerful 
argument of principIe can be made for the thesis that the party at 
fault should only be liable on a conventional tort basis for the other 
party's costs (i.e. reliance damages) rather than on a contractual 
basis for the other party's expectations52. Other very important 
exceptions are cases where expectation losses cannot be reliably 
computed, cases where reliance losses exceed the expectationvalue 
of the promise, and breaches by consumers in contracts for sale by 
merchants of relatively standardized goods53. 
Third Party Beneficiaries 
An aspect of the rule known in common law systems as "privity 
of contract" is not really in doubt: one may not be obligated by an 
agreement to which one is not a party. The issue which has caused 
more trouble is whether a contract for the benefict of a third party 
(stipulatio alteri) can be directly enforced by the third party 
beneficiary. Civillaw systems have widely recognised a right of 
action on the contract to the third party beneficiary and the same 
52. For the case of unilateral mistakes the rule proposed in the text is 
gaining force in the U.S.A.: see Restatement (Seeond) 01 Contraets, section 
153 (1979). In respect of cases where "objective interpretation" is applied 
Whittier has put the case well: "Under the present law the non-consenting party 
is liable on the contract itself if [he carelessly led the other party reasonably to 
think there was assent). The chief unfortunate result of this state of the law is 
that he is bound to the contraet though the other party is notified of the 
mistake before the latter has changed his position or suffered any damage. To 
hold one liable for a merely careless use of language whieh causes no damage 
whatever to the party to whom the language is addressed is certainly 
inconsistent with principIes generally applied. If D drives down Michigan 
A venue. Chicago, in a careless manner but no one is hurt, can any of those 
who might have been hurt sue D1", WHlTIlER, "The Restatement of Contracts 
and Mutual Assent", Calif. L . Rev., 17,441 at pp. 441-442. 
53. See M. A. EISEMBERG, op. cit., in n. 51, pp. 794-798. 
56 J. M. ELEGIDO 
has been done in many common law jurisdictions54• But the U.K. 
and other common law jurisdictions still insist on disallowing 
enforcement by the third party, even if the principIe is shot through 
with exceptions. 
There are many considerations which are relevant to this 
argument55 and a review of them would be out of place here. But 
in connection with the topic of this paper it is certainly possible to 
state that in so far as it is accepted that to protect the institution of 
promising is a proper function of the law, the doctrine of privity of 
contract is an anomaly which stands in great need of special 
justification, and this justification has not been forthcoming. Any 
principIe that in certain circumstances56 will allow a promisor who 
has received performance to ignore his or her promise certainly 
undermines the integrity and dependability of the contract 
institution. 
Consideration Versus Causa 
Perhaps the most characteristic trait of the common law of 
contraet vis-a-vis civil law systems is the requirement of 
consideration for the validity of a eontraet. An Englishman, we are 
told, is bound not beeause he has made a promise but beeause he 
has made a bargain57. Bargains are agreements in whieh the 
promise of each party is "purchased" by the other. For a bargain to 
exist the parties must exchange value or promise to do so. The 
54. AH the jurisdictions in the U.S.A., Ghana, South Africa. 
55. A good discussion and a strong plea for the abolition of this rule can 
be found in R. FLANNIGAN, "Privity -The End of an Era (Error)", L.Q.R., 103 
(1987), p. 564. 
56. Usually after the death of disappearance of the original promisee, or 
where the promisee, while still intending the benefit, does not wish to incur 
the litigation or other costs of cnforcing the contracto 
57. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE and FIFOOT,Law o/Contraet, 1986, 111 ed., 
pp. 67-68. 
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value forthcoming from either party is what is called "the 
.consideration". Accordingly a promise to make a gift is made 
without consideration and is not binding on the promisor; an 
exception is allowed in many jurisdictions to a promise made under 
seal. 
The doctrine of consideration has been under sustained attack 
for many years. Two main arguments have been put forward in its 
defence. It has been argued that it reflects the belief that a promise 
per se is not necessarily binding58. As this belief has already been 
criticised in this paper, there will be no need to add anything here. 
Others think that consideration is useful as a rough and ready test 
of the readiness of the parties to undertake "legal" rather than 
merely "good faith" obligations59. This paper is not the place 
where to assess in detail the rather dubious force of this second 
argumento What is clear is that as a result of the existence of this 
doctrine agreements entered into serio ac deliberato animo end up 
being held to be unenforceable in ways that are often unexpected 
for the parties. Agreements liable to be considered void for lack of 
consideration include such commercially important instances as a 
promise to keep and offer open, a banker' s commercial credit, a 
promise to accept a lesser sum in full settlement of a debt for a 
larger one and re-negotiated contracts where the duties of one of 
the parties remain unchanged. It is clear that the doctrine allows 
"the most cynical disregard of promises solemnly undertaken"60, 
thereby undermining the purpose of the law of contract as spelt out 
before. However, to argue that the law should aim at the protection 
of the institution of promising does not commit one to the view that 
58. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A Hislory ollhe Common Law 01 Contract, 
Oxford 1975, p. 488. 
59. L. FULLER, "Consideration as Form", Col. L. Rev., 41 (1941), p. 
799; C. J. HAMSON, "The Reform of Consideration", L.Q.R., 54 (1938), p. 
233. 
60. Sixlh Inlerim Report 01 the Law Revision Commiue, 1937, Cmd. 
5449. 
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the law should enforce aH promises as such. The State may fair1y 
take the po sitio n that to attempt to use its compulsory processes to 
reinforce sorne c1asses of promise would cause greater harm to the 
cornmon good than the breach of sorne of those promises would 
do. But in order to reflect this type of problem the civil doctrine of 
causa seems a much better instrument, because of its greater 
flexibility, than the cornmon law doctrine of consideration. 
The Merger of Contractual and Delictual Obligations 
There is nothing "necessary" about the great divides that 
traditionally have separated in cornmon law systems Contract, Tort 
and Restitution (or quasi-contract), the three more important are as 
of the law of obligations. It is well known that the law of 
obligations is structured within civillaw systems as a more unified 
whole sharing common basic concepts. And it has often be en 
pointed out that the wide gulf that exists in cornmon law between 
duties which are voluntarily assumed (contraet) and duties whieh 
are imposed by the law (ton and restitution) is to sorne extent 
artificial. Both types of duties eommonly arise from sorne 
voluntary act of a party, whether a promise, a statement or a deed, 
which brings him into a relationship with other party on which 
duties are exacted. As a matter of fact the main interest of many 
who argue for a greater recognition of this fundamental unity of the 
law of obligations is to overcome the distasteful consequences 
imposed within the area of contraet by the doctrines of 
consideration and privity and one can fully simpathize with this 
aim. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that in many respeets tort 
and contract serve ideals which pull in different directions. That of 
tort is that in any given situation a minimum acceptable standard of 
behaviour be fixed by the law; that of eontract that any two parties 
should be given freedom to regulate the legal rights and duties 
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between them as they see fit61 • While both ideals have necessarily 
to be accommodated by any viable legal system, those proposing a 
merger of contract and tort often intend in practice a substitution of 
contract principIes by tort principIes through minimizing the room 
given to the parties to shape their own legal relations. Thus 
Gilmore, one of the main apostles of the fusion of contract and 
tort, has explicitly stated that "we are fast approaching the point 
where, to prevent unjust enrichment, any benefit received by a 
defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly meant as a gift; 
where any detriment reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance 
on a defendant's assurances must be recompensed. When that 
point is reached there is really no longer any viable distinction 
between liability in contract and liability in tort"62. 
This statement contains a good deal of wishful thinking, even in 
respect of the law in the U.S.A. But we may retain from it the 
thesis that once "the point" which Gilmore refers to in it is reached, 
contract will cease being a meaningfuI category; and conversely, 
for so long as that point is not reached, contract will retain a 
measure of independece from tort. We will now review the very 
serious problems which would arise if that point were ever 
reached. 
In the first place, it should be clear that if contraet is not 
recognized and given wide scope, flexibility of arrangements is 
likely to suffer. Those legal regulations are likely to be adopted 
which are satisfactory for the majority of the people involved (e.g. 
empIoyment rules which take into account the needs and interests 
of mature male full-time workers) while the needs of minority 
groups (e.g. women, students, young and old workers, part-
timers, etc.) will tend to be neglected. Even if eventually the 
regulations are particularized to take into account the needs ofthose 
minority groups, then sub-groups will be neglected. Only the great 
61. See T. HADDEN, "Contract, Tort and Crime: the Forms of Legal 
Thought", L.Q.R., 87 (1971),240 at pp. 243. 
62. G. GILMORE, op. cit., in n. 1, p. 88 (emphasis added). 
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multiplicity of solutions provided by the free interplay which 
contractual solutions malee possible is likely to be flexible enough. 
Secondly, if the law were to cease protecting bare expectations 
serious problems of uncertainty would have to be faced. If only 
reliance malees a promise enforceable, what set of facts constitutes 
reliance? "In one important sen se, reliance is ubiquitous. The fact 
of a promise can always serve to de ter further contracting. For 
example, if A promises to seU B a cow, then, ten minutes after the 
promise, B can justifiably claim to have relied on the promise by 
not looking elsewhere for a cow"63. Again, a form ofrelying on a 
contract is to enter into another contract with a third party which 
depends on the first contract for its performance. Thus a builder 
relies on his agreement with a sub-contractor in order to agree to 
execute a project at a certain price. Now it might be urged that 
entering into the second contract cannot be reliance on the first 
contract until some action is taleen relying on that second contract, 
for until then the second contract will not become binding. So, 
how much reliance should there be to justify the enforcement of 
contractual obligations? And the difficulty in determining the point 
in time at which reliance talees place will arise not only before the 
court in case of dispute but also, and more disturbingly for the 
needs of commercial life, at the time of performance: the parties 
will often just not know whether there exists a valid legal 
obligation to perform. In summary, if the test of obligation is the 
presence of reliance, the standards for determining whether 
obligation exists necessarily become vague and unpredictable. 
Thirdly, if reliance were to be the test for determining the 
existence of an obligation, in the absence of relianee there could be 
no obligation. Then, as Levin and Me Dowel have pointed out, 
"members of the business community who routinely make 
executory bilateral contracts, often without thereafter signifieantly 
changing their position in any demostrable way, would find 
63. J. LEVIN & B. Me DOWELL, op. cit., in n. 10, p. 46. 
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themselves without enforceable deals ... Parties would be forced to 
change their plans artificially, even to begin execution of the 
contractjust to seal the bargain"64. 
Fourthly, as Fried has argued65, it is circular and incoherent to 
suggest that the protection of reliance should be the reason for 
enforcing promises. There is no general moral principIe that if B 
suffers harm by relying on A, then A has done sorne wrong to B. 
Fried's example is that if one person rents an apartment because 
his neighbour play s chamber music, the neighbour does no wrong 
by deciding to play elsewhere. In other words, in respect of 
promises reliance is not a sufficient basis of obligation, but is 
protected as an incident of protecting the practice of promising. 
Fifthly, there are important differences between contractual and 
delictualliability in the common law. The most important one is 
that in contract expectations are protected, while in tort cases only 
reliance damages are usually recoverable. The merger of contract 
and tort would therefore have the effect of making only reliance 
damages recoverable in contract situations. We have already seen 
that there exist weighty arguments against the law following this 
policy. 
Finally, and most fundamentally, the idea of "voluntary creation 
of obligation" cannot be supplanted by that of "voluntary action" 
(with the subsequent obligation being created by the law) without a 
substantial reduction of human freedom and spontaneity. As Finnis 
has argued "a practice or practical doctrine according to which 
obligation carne into being... whenever one expressed one's 
intentions of acting in the future, or whenever one expressed such 
intentions knowing that others might rely on one, would in each 
case be a practice or practical doctrine too restrictive of individual 
autonomy and self-direction, too cramping of human expressi-
veness and communication"66. Thus, if A announces his intention 
64. [bid., p. 80. 
65. C. FRIED, op. cit., in n. 4, p. 10. 
66. J.M. FINNIS, op. cit., in n. 8, p. 308. 
62 J. M. ELEGIDO 
of building a public swimming pool, does he thereby become liable 
to anybody who had bought a pair of swimming trunks, if later on 
he fails to carry out his intention? To give legal protection to bare 
reliance would entail an unjustified and impractical restraint on 
individual liberty; people would have to be careful never to 
announce their intentions for the future in order to avoid 
unwittingly incurring onerous obligations. 
A similar point can be made in respect of merging contract and 
restitution. If a stranger puts fertilizer on may land, as a result of 
which I am enabled to grow a bumper crop, must I pay for the 
fertilizer, even if I never requested it? The tradiciontal answer in 
English law absolved me from liability; the person who fertilized 
my land without my requesting him to do so is considered to be an 
"officious intermeddler", a volunteer whom even equity will not 
aid67• Sorne exceptions to this principIe are necessary in special 
cases such as emergencies, but it is far from clear, to say the least, 
that the present position of the law is indefensible; why should I be 
deprived of the choice whether to spen money on a new bam rather 
than on fertilizer? 
In the end the whole argument comes to the point that while 
freedom and autonomy is not the only human good it is 
nevertheless a great good and well worth protecting. And far more 
powerful arguments than any yet brought forward by any "death of 
contract" theorist will be necessary in order to show that men's 
freedom to make their own arrangements in substantial areas of 
their lives, for so long as they do not conflict with the common 
good of the society, should be radicall y curtailed. 
Freedom oi Contraet and J ustiee in Exehanges 
In the XIX Century the principIe of freedom of contract was 
carried very far indeed. Once it was assumed that the basic 
67. Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398. 
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justification for the law to enforce contracts at aH was the respect 
due to the autonomy of individual s who give themselves their own 
law, it would have been self-contradictory for the law to contrive 
to limit or even thwart this autonomous will in the process of 
ensuring its efficacy. But if the enforcement of contracts by the law 
is based on the common good of the community, which is 
promoted by allowing individual s a measure of autonomy to make 
their own arrangements and structure their own relationships, the 
argument for giving unrestricted free rein to the autonomy of the 
will coHapses. If enforcing the contract will harm the common 
good in some ways, it cannot be pressumed any more that the 
contract should be enforced. The harm to the common good which 
is likely to result from restricting the autonomy of individuals by 
curtailing in given ways freedom of contract will have to be 
compared to the harm caused to prejudiced parties and to the 
overall standards of fairness of the society by leaving more issues 
to private agreement. Of course a strictly objective comparison of 
these factors will be impossible to achieve as it would demand 
comparing incommensurables. But it will always be possible to 
effect a prudential comparison within the framework of 
commÍtments and values of a given society. In these matters 
Aristotle's advice that one should not demand greater precision 
than the subject-matter can admit is most appropriate68• 
An altemative and more limited argument to try and still save the 
libertarían conception of maximum freedom of contract rests on 
pointing out that a person ought to be considered to be the best 
judge of his own interests. Atiyah's answer seems perfectly 
adequate: "In fact, all democratic Westem societies have massive 
bodies of law -retirement pension laws, compulsory medie al 
insurance, compulsory liability insurance law, and so forth- that 
demostrate our considerable simpathy for one who wrongly 
68. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Elhics. 1094 b 23, 1098 a 27. 
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calculates ... The proposition that a person is always the best judge 
of his own interests is a good starting point for laws and 
institutional arrangements, but as an infallible empirical proposition 
it is an outrage to human experience"69. 
This argument couId be made more radical by defending a 
totally subjective theory of vaIue. Thus T. Hobbes argued in the 
Leviatham70 that "the vaIue of all things contracted for, is 
measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just 
value, is that which they be contented to give". The earlier c1assical 
contract theorists, as well as many judges, rested some of their 
main arguments on such a theory. lt is important to realize that 
such a view simply assumes that is is impossible to assign a value 
or a range of values to any good or service on a rational basis. The 
examination of such an assumption could lead us very far, but for 
the purposes of this paper it will be enough to observe that a court 
can compare the price that a party to a contract has engaged to pay 
with a market price or a cost price and then give due weight to 
other tangible or intangible benefits offered by the seller as well as 
to the seller's costs, his reputation, the normal range of price 
variation, etc ... There is nothing impossibIe about any of this and 
in fact common Iaw courts engage often in this type of estimates in 
order to review the fairness of some contracts. Sorne examples are 
off-market contracts between a beneficiary and his trustee or 
between a director and his company. 
We can conc1ude that there is nothing wrong in principIe with 
the idea that in sorne cases society can establish objective standard s 
of conduct which are to prevail over freedom of contract and that 
cannot be evaded in any circumstances, even on the basis of 
consent or agreement by the parties affected. SimilarIy, there is in 
principIe nothing anomaIous in the idea of the Iaw prescribing 
certain criteria for the construction of contracts which may have the 
69. P. S. ATIYAH, "Book Rcview", lJarv. L. Rev., 95 (1981), 509, at p. 
527. 
70. (1651) 75. 
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effect to add to, detract or modify from what the parties have 
explicitIy or implicitIy agreed. It is perfectIy possible that the 
specific rules laid down on these issues by a given legal order be 
unwise, or too restrictive of the legitimate autonomy of people; or 
that they give too much unchecked power to officious judges to 
intermeddle in private agreements. But if this is the case such 
norms will be defective because of these specific defects, not 
because of their breaching a supposed general principIe of respect 
at all costs for private agreements. The real difficulties in this area 
arise in the consideration of more specific issues, not at the level of 
general principIes; this is the reason why we will now briefly 
consider some of the main problem areas. 
The first issue concerns the protection of naive, uninformed or 
dependent people and of those in situations of grave need, so that 
others will not be allowed, through the vehicle of contracts, to take 
advantage of them. Here, by the nature of the case, the remedy has 
often to be left to the judges, to determine after the evento Civillaw 
systems have tendend to give wide powers in this area to judges to 
reform the contents of contracts in appropriate circumstances (e.g. 
unsophisticated bargainers, inequality of bargaining power, 
monopolistic position, etc.) through the doctrines of good faith, 
boni mores or public policy, and abuse of right. In the common 
law world American jurisdictions tend to be bolder in invoking 
public policy and lunconscionability"71, but the general tendency 
has been to use more closely defined rules such as estoppel, 
laches, nominate torts, determinate applications of public policy 
71. For instance, secLion 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a 
court to strike out unconscionable clauses or even the whole contract. AIso the 
Restatement (Second) 01 Contracts, seco 208, 1979. Another interesting 
development is the emerging American rule that a party is not bound by a 
provision of a contract, even if he has signcd ít, if he had no actual knowlcdge 
of it and it is whoIly unexpected and grossly unfair (e.g. because it has never 
before been included in contracts of that nature). See e.g. Restatement (Second) 
olContracts, sec. 211,1981. 
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and the discretionary elements in remedies in equity72. Through 
these mean s the courts are often able to reach similar solutions to 
those arrived at in civil law systems but, because of their being 
narrower, they are less readily extended to novel situations. 
Perhaps influenced by this, judges in common law countries have 
sometimes tended to wait for alead from the legislature. 
Whichever system is used the basic consideration should be to 
protect those who need protection without thereby reducing 
excessively the overalllevel of reliability of contracts by rendering 
them vulnerable to discretionary judicial review on the basis of 
unspecific criteria and without depriving the parties to be protected 
of their right to contract. An object lesson in the dangers of 
"protection" is provided by the American case Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.13 in which a furniture company located in a 
ghetto area of Washington D.C. sold on credit household items, 
inc1uding an expensive stereo, to a welfare mother. The credit 
arrangement was that each purchase price was added to aH 
previous debts and all purchases were deemed to be leases until all 
outstanding debts to the company had been paid. When the 
defendant defaulted on a purchase the plaintiff company sued for 
possession of all the items bought over the previous five years. It 
was held that the contract was unconscionable. Without trying to 
criticize this specific decision, it is important to realise that if ghetto 
welfare mothers are allowed to escape the consequences of 
promise-breaking, they will soon be unable to get any credit; and it 
is also of interest to note that a later report by the Federal Trade 
Commission 74 found that the security practices of ghetto furniture 
72. M.A. MILLNER, "Contrasts in Contract and Tort", Current Legal 
Problems, (1961), 68 at p. 81. 
73. 350 F. 2d 445, 18 A.L.R. 3d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
74. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Eeonomie Report in lnstallment 
Credit and Retail Sales Praetiees oi Distriet oi Columbia Retailers, 1968, 
reprinted in part in L. FULLER & M. EISEMBERG, Basie Contraet Law, 1981, 
4th ed., p. 719. 
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stores of the District of Columbia were defensible and their profit 
margins were equal to or lower than those of similar stores in other 
neigbourhoods: the higher costs of selling and of collecting in 
credit sales, as well as the higher risk of default mean that the 
selling pracúces in a ghetto must be more stringent if there are to be 
credit sales at aH. 
A second area of problems is related to cases where an 
unforeseen change of circumstances renders the contract signifi-
cantly more onerous for one of the pafÚes or makes it pointless. If 
the contract is not to become a vehicle of injustice courts have to be 
given powers to adjust the resulting losses or the duties of the 
parties. AIso in this issue civillaw courts, through the doctrine of 
good faith, have wider powers to adjust the duties of the parties 
than those given to common law judges by the rules of frustration. 
But the basic considerations in both systems are similar. On the 
one hand the common good demands stability of contracts. 
Accordingly the principIe of fidelity to the contract must be upheld 
and those who enter into contracts must count with the possibility 
of changes of circumstances. But, on the other hand, fairness 
requires not treaúng the pafÚes, and not allowing them to treat each 
other, as pure gamblers unless that is the substance of their 
agreement. Once these general principIes are taken into account, 
the specific regulation of these problems by a given legal system 
can never be a quesúon of pure deduction from them. 
Perhaps the most difficult issue in all this topic is that of 
contracts where no party has unfairly imposed on the other and 
where there has been no supervening change of circumstances to 
un balance the agreement, but where, nevertheless, a clear lack of 
balance in the obligaúons of the parties can be discemed: there may 
be formal reciprocity in the sense that there is give and take on both 
sides, but in fact the reciprocity does not exist. In cases where 
there was no specific intention by one party to benefit the other it 
can be said that there is an element of injustice in the exchange, 
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and, as such, the enforcement of the contract by the law is contrary 
to the common good. However, to give power to the judges to 
either invalidate or modify this type of agreements would probably 
reduce so greatly the reliability of all contracts that it would tend to 
result in a far more serious damage to the common good. In 
practice the English rule which does not attempt to authorize the 
judge to investigate the adequacy of consideration is probably 
wise 75. In sorne special cases (e.g. legislation prescribing "fair 
rents" and how to compute them) the legislature may prescribe in 
advance sorne conditions to be met by all contracts in order to 
ensure an approximate equality in the exchange; but the experience 
with this type of legislation has not been too happy. Generally 
speaking it is true to say that the more a given legal system tries to 
protect substantive justice in contracts the more certainty willbe 
impaired. In the end it is a matter for the prudence of the legislator 
to determine for each specific type of situation how these two 
objectives should be balanced. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has endeavoured to establish three basic theses. 
First, that the practice of promising is very much for the common 
good in which it greatly enlarges the area of freedom available to 
the citizens while still making it possible for them to co-operate in 
large, complex and long-Iasting undertakings; accordingly there are 
very good reasons for the law of contract to go beyond protecting 
the fact of reliance and preventing unjust enrichment, and take 
steps to protect and strengthen the practice of promising itself. 
75. In the absencc of fraud, duress, etc. the only situation under the 
common law in which it is possible to help the improvident party to an 
unbalanced contract is where exclusion clauses are so wide that actually one of 
the parties is undcr no obligation at a11. In this case there is such a radicallack 
of reciprocity in the contract that there is no considcration at aH and 
accordingly the contract is void. 
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The second thesis which this paper has defended is that there is 
no justification for attributing any special efficacy in creating 
obligations to acts of will, taken by themselves. The ultimate 
justification for the legal enforcement of promises lies rather in the 
fact that this serves the common good of the society; and it is 
precisely the need to protect this common good that can justifiably 
lead public authorities to deny full effect to the "will of the parties" 
when tbis would produce an injustice. 
The third main thesis of this article is that when the analysis is 
pushed back the ultimate essential question turns out to be to 
determine with precision the status and mutal relations of the basic 
intrinsic human goods. The root cause of the insufficiencies of the 
theories we have examined lay precisaly in a fau1ty answer to this 
question. The position defended in this article is that freedom is 
one of those basic aspects of human well-being, but that it is not 
the only one, nor more basic or important than the others. 
It is possible to derive light from these basic principIes in 
studying sorne more specific problems of the law of contract, and 
we have endeavoured to show this in the last sections of this 
paper. But in the last analysis it is clear that in framing particular 
rules much depends on the specific circumstances of a given 
society and on its peculiar scale of values. As Justice Holmes well 
said, "it is a fallacy to believe that a system of law can be worked 
out like mathematics from sorne general axioms of conduct"76. 
76. O. W. HOLMES, "The Path of the Law", Collected Papers, London 
1920, p. 180. 
